Tobacco industry interference in the DRC
The most vulnerable communities, such as young people and those with low incomes, are particularly affected by the aggressive promotion of retail tobacco products.
The DRC lacks clear regulatory measures to limit industry interference in public health policies.
DRC ranked 76th out of 100 countries with a score of 72 in the 2025 Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index, reflecting weak transparency, sustained industry access to policymakers, and limited safeguards against conflicts of interest.
In the DRC, article 113 of Framework Act n°18/035 on the Organization of Public Health prohibits any form of interference by the tobacco industry in government policy.
Historically, the tobacco industry has opposed tobacco control efforts. Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) recognizes the need to counter efforts by the tobacco industry to subvert tobacco control policies.
The tobacco industry uses a multitude of tactics to shape and influence policy. It uses its lobbying and marketing mechanisms to manipulate the media, discredit proven scientific research, and influence governments to promote and distribute their products. Also, the tobacco industry in the DRC gains visibility and support through sponsorship of public events and corporate social responsibility donations.
This page provides an overview of the tobacco industry’s interference in the DRC, related to the following aspects:
- Tobacco market in the DRC
- Tactics of the tobacco industry
- Industry facts and myths
- Global tobacco industry interference index
- Recommendations to address industry interference in the DRC
Tobacco marketin the DRC
Market share of tobacco companies in 2021
According to Direction Générale des Douanes et Accises (DGDA) data, BAT is the country’s largest tobacco importer, with a 62.5% market share. Other key players include SHENIMED SPRL with 34.12%, Etoile du Congo (1.96%), and DRC Duty-Free International SPRL (0.96%). Duty-free tobacco imports to the DRC were worth 90.3 billion Congolese francs in 2021. This represents a shortfall of 15.9 billion Congolese francs due to non-payment of tax.
Tobacco companies' market share in 2021
Source: DGDA 2021
Tacticsof the tobacco industry
Globally, the tobacco industry has used a variety of tactics to interfere with the adoption and implementation of tobacco control measures. These tactics are also used in the DRC, such as:
- Maneuvering to hijack political and legislative processes;
- Exaggerating the industry’s economic importance;
- Manipulating public opinion to gain the appearance of respectability;
- Supporting activities of front groups to suppress certain facts about smoking;
- Discrediting proven scientific evidence;
- Intimidating governments with litigation or the threats of litigation;
- Deploying corporate social responsibility commitments to compromise public officials.
Industry factsand myths
The tobacco industry distorts facts to sell products.
Tobacco companies have spent decades discrediting and reframing scientific data on the health risks of tobacco products.This module shares some of the dominant myths circulating in the DRC:
Myth: The tobacco industry provides many jobs and other opportunities for Congolese youth.
Reality: The number of jobs provided by tobacco companies is not as high as some media campaigns, such as BAT’s ”Battle of Minds” competition, claim when they target students.
Myth: Second-hand smoke may bother people, but it’s not dangerous.
Reality: Article 8 of the FCTC emphasizes that exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke causes disease, disability, and death.
Second-hand smoke consists of emissions from cigarettes, pipes, and cigars, as well as inhaled substances, and contains many chemicals, including more than 50 known carcinogens.
Myth: Shisha smoking is less harmful than cigarette smoking.
Reality: Shisha smoke is very harmful to the lungs. In addition, shisha can lead to serious health problems, such as memory loss.
Myth: The tobacco industry is vital to the economy.
Reality: According to the WHO, the tobacco industry and the deadly impact of the products it manufactures cost economies worldwide more than $1 trillion (USD) a year in health expenses and lost productivity.
Myth: Tobacco growers are prosperous.
Reality: The tobacco industry lends money to smallholders for their farming activities; in the event of poor production, farmers are still obliged to repay their debts.
Global TobaccoIndustry Interference Index - DRC
The Tobacco Industry Interference Index (TIII) is an international monitoring tool, grounded in Article 5.3 Guidelines of the WHO FCTC, that assesses how much influence and interference the tobacco industry exerts on government policies. It measures the extent to which governments are responding to tobacco industry interference and protecting their public health policies from the tobacco industry’s commercial and vested interests as required under the WHO FCTC.
The index is based on publicly available information on tobacco industry interference in countries and the corresponding government responses. Countries receive rankings from civil society groups, with a lower index score indicating less tobacco industry interference and greater protection of public health. The scores range from 0 to 100.Tobacco Industry Interference Index
For the first inclusion in the TIII, the DRC has a score of 72, and ranks 76th out of 100 countries.
This indicates a high level of tobacco industry interference in public policy, and reflects weak transparency, sustained industry access to policymakers, and limited safeguards against conflicts of interest.Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index by country
Key Findings from the Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index for the DRC, 2025
2025 marks an important milestone: it is the first year the DRC is included in the global TIII. This provides a benchmark for future monitoring and accountability. This year is therefore a landmark year for DRC because it is the first assessment of tobacco industry interference in DRC on an international scale, it is a baseline year for tracking progress and gaps in the implementation of Article 5.3 Guidelines of the WHO FCTC, evidence from the index can strengthen policy reform and guide government action, and regional comparison can henceforth be done.Based on the Global TIII, the summary findings for the DRC are as follows:
Industry Participation in Policy Development
Industry Participation in Policy Development
Strong evidence points to collusion between certain policymakers and the tobacco industry (TI), aimed at influencing tobacco control policy in violation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.
For example:
A 2023 NGO project revealed “opaque partnerships” between government authorities (including parliamentarians) and the TI, specifically formed to obstruct the adoption of strict tobacco control policies. This interference has delayed the full implementation of measures such as the ratification of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, which was scheduled twice during parliamentary sessions but never discussed, despite the ratification of the WHO FCTC.
Industry CSR Activities
Industry CSR Activities
No recent corporate social responsibility (CSR) activity has been officially supported by the government, but there is a history of public endorsement for donations or events sponsored by tobacco manufacturers. Since the entry into force of Law No. 18/035, all forms of sponsorship or contributions from the industry are theoretically prohibited. In practice, no financial or in-kind donations from the TI to a public institution have been reported during the 2023–2025 period.
Benefits to the Industry
Benefits to the Industry
The government has granted significant advantages to the TI through weak enforcement of fiscal laws and delays in implementing regulations. In 2021, British American Tobacco (BAT) failed to pay excise duties on 189 imports valued at USD 12.9 million, causing a USD 2.6 million loss to the public treasury, while over CDF 90 billion worth of tobacco was imported duty-free, resulting in CDF 15.9 billion in lost taxes. In 2024, despite a major tax increase, the industry circumvented regulations using shell companies. These enforcement gaps have consistently favored industry interests over public health.
For example:
Unnecessary Interaction
Unnecessary Interaction
No official social meetings were recorded during the period, and the government did not officially accept help from the TI for law enforcement operations. However, there are no regulations preventing such interactions from occurring.
Transparency
Transparency
There is no mechanism for disclosing interactions between the government and the TI. There is no public register of companies, lobbyists, or industry donations, making citizen or institutional monitoring difficult. When interactions do occur (for example, in the context of regulation or fiscal oversight), they are not documented or made public. In practice, potential meetings with tobacco companies are neither announced nor recorded for public access.
Conflict of Interest
Conflict of Interest
Electoral or anti-corruption legislation in the country contains no specific provision prohibiting tobacco companies from funding political parties or candidates, or requiring the disclosure of such funding. In the absence of explicit rules, the TI is free to provide financial support to political actors without transparency, creating a major conflict of interest.
Preventive Measures
Preventive Measures
None of the measures recommended under Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC and its guidelines have been adopted. There is a code of conduct for public officials, but it does not contain provisions to address the TI. There is no awareness program on Article 5.3, no policy prohibiting donations, and no institutional transparency policy. This constitutes a major structural gap.
Recommendationsto address industry interference in the DRC
Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stipulates that public health policies on tobacco control must not be influenced by the commercial and other interests of the tobacco industry.
A needs assessment report for the implementation of the FCTC by the WHO convention secretariat on the DRC in 2015.
Law no. 18/035 of December 13, 2018, establishes fundamental principles for the organization of public health in the DRC and prohibits any form of interference by the tobacco industry. However, effective implementation measures have yet to be taken. A shared number of recommendations on addressing tobacco industry interference following the WHO convention and complemented with other recommendations are as follows;The DRC should:
- not allow a person employed by the tobacco industry or an entity dedicated to promoting its interests to serve on a public body, committee, or advisory group that develops or implements tobacco control measures or public health policy;
- not accept, support, or endorse any voluntary code of conduct or instrument proposed by the tobacco industry as a substitute for legally enforceable tobacco control measures, or endorse any offer of assistance or proposal for tobacco control legislation or policy developed by or in collaboration with the tobacco industry;
- not authorize an official or employee of the state or of a semi-public or quasi-public body to accept payments, gifts, or services, in cash or in kind, from the tobacco industry;
- ensure full transparency for all interactions between government officials and the tobacco industry, including public disclosure of the nature, timing, and content of any meetings or correspondence;
- refrain from approving or supporting activities described as socially responsible by the tobacco industry, as well as from forming partnerships for these activities or participating in them;
- include provisions on tobacco industry interference in the code of conduct for public officials. It is therefore recommended that this code of conduct be updated to include the guidelines set out in article 5.3 of the FCTC.
